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Abstract 
The purpose of the research is to: 1) investigate the interpretation of the sections in the Lands Act of 1995 that provide 
for the statutory recognition on one hand, and conversion of customary land, on the other; and 2) discuss the effects of 
the said sections on customary landholders. Methodologically, qualitative methods (largely in-depth interviews) were 
used to conclude that governments in sub-Sahara Africa are the architects of tenure insecurity because they (knowingly 
or otherwise) enact laws that are contradictory or conflicting in nature. In the case of Zambia, there are contradicting 
sections within the Lands Act 1995 where, while one section provides for the conversion of customary land, the other 
provides for statutory recognition of the same traditional tenure. This therefore casts a shadow of confusion regarding 
the meaning of “statutory recognition” in that in practice “legality”, by way of holding private title deed, always takes 
precedence over “social legitimacy”. The implication of this is tenure insecurity and an associated avalanche of 
evictions, elite capture, sub-division and enclosures of common pool resources, land grabs, and land conflicts. We 
recommend that, guided by research, concerned governments should consider emulating other countries like Tanzania 
and Botswana, which have enacted “bespoke” land laws that are specifically meant for state land, and other land laws 
specifically for customary land. 
Keywords: Zambia, state land, customary land, customary land recognition, customary land conversion 
1. Introduction 
Land is arguably one of the most fundamental natural resources of any country (Mabogunje, 1990; Agbosu, 2000). 
Chikhwenda (2002) and Mabikke (2014) argue that this is because the resource forms the basis for existence as all 
forms of production, food, shelter and human sustenance rely on the presence of land. Furthermore, land provides 
welfare support; is a source of prestige, a symbol of spiritual status, personal dignity and identity (Leonard and 
Longbottom, 2000). With this in mind, it can be argued that the manner in which the resource is administered can 
contribute to a country‟s sustainable development agenda (Deininger, 2003). However, this can potentially be hampered 
by the fact that about 90% of land in many developing countries is still under customary ownership (Deininger, 2003). 
For this reason, many observers, policy makers and development agencies, like the World Bank, vigorously campaign 
for the transformation of customary tenure systems into the widely eulogized system of private property under statutory 
tenure (Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1995). This is in order to activate what de Soto (2000) calls the dead capital in the 
customary tenure systems. The drive towards what is regarded as modernisation of customary tenure has been anchored 
on the various sources of dissatisfaction with the customary tenure institutions. This includes the fact that customary 
tenure is said to be insecure, backward, antiquated, primitive accumulation and it does not promote land/credit markets 
(Shivji, 2006; Deininger, 2003).  
However, the agenda to transform the customary tenure systems into private property tenure seems to be undermined by 
the usually contradictory nature of the provisions of state land laws in many developing countries. In most sub-Sahara 
African countries, for example, it is not uncommon to find pieces of legislation that provide for privatisation of 
customary land while at the same time enabling the „statutory recognition and continuation‟ of the customary tenure 
systems (Ng‟ombe and Keivan, 2013). This contradictory legislation is highlighted by anecdotal evidence, which 
suggests that although its existence is „statutorily recognised‟, customary tenure has in practice continued to be 
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expropriated by public officials on grounds that the customary tenure system lacks security as the landholders do not 
own title deeds (de Soto, 2000). Numerous court orders have been issued in favour of individuals who may have 
acquired title to their land after having very recently converted customary land into private property (Lobulu, 1998). 
The result, in many cases, has led to customary land owners being evicted from their land once the land is successfully 
converted to private property (Brown, 2005). This perfectly mirrors the situation in Zambia where the provisions to both 
statutorily recognise and convert customary land have had mixed outcomes. 
The land tenure system in Zambia is twofold: state and customary land. In line with the provisions of legal pluralism, 
where state and customary law co-exist as two legal systems, state land is administered by central government using 
state law while customary land is administered by traditional rulers using local customs (Ng‟ombe and Keivani, 2013). 
The land laws previously in place upon acquiring independence were vestiges of colonial rule, perpetuating colonial 
systems of race-based land categorization (Knight, 2010). Such laws were neither adequate for addressing modern land–
related transactions, particularly the growing land markets in urban and peri-urban areas; nor relevant to the complex 
and multiple ways that rural Zambians use, share and transact land (ibid). Over the past four decades, successive 
Zambian governments have made land reforms aimed at increasing national development and prosperity by 
empowering people with land ownership and attracting investment with the promise of greater tenure security (GRZ, 
1995). However, Zambian land lawmakers have faced and continue to confront a complex situation, administering land 
under two land tenure systems operating under different land laws. State land is governed by statutory law whereas 
customary land is governed by customary legal paradigms. Being statutorily recognised, the decisions and rules 
established under customary tenure systems are recognised as legally valid and binding by law. The two systems do not 
operate in complete isolation from one another but a fissure exists between them. The end result are two legal systems 
functioning side by side, blending and mixing, and increasingly clashing at places of interaction. Against this 
background, this paper uses Zambia‟s dual tenure system to examine the nature of the interface between legality and 
social legitimacy in land ownership, particularly insofar as this relates to provisions in the law that recognise customary 
land whilst at the same time providing for the conversion of customary land to private property. In so doing, we attempt 
to answer key questions, including: 1) What is the interpretation, relationship between, and consequences of sections 
7(1) and 8(1) in the Lands Act of 1995 – the former provides for the recognition of customary land tenure systems while 
the latter provides for the conversion of customary land to private property 2) Why, despite the provision of its 
„recognition‟ in the Lands Act, has customary land continued to be expropriated by private land owners with support 
from public officials, leading to customary land owners being evicted from their land? The paper draws on international 
literature, personal experience and research in Zambia to find answers to these questions. 
2. The (Legal) Case for Customary Land Tenure 
Customary land rights can be discussed in the context of human rights, in general, and self-determination, in particular 
(United Nations, 2008). These are provided by, among others, the International Labour Organization‟s Convention 
number 169 of 1989 (ILO, 1989), African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Organisation of African Unity, 1981),  
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the UN Declaration) (United Nations, 2008). 
Article 13 of the ILO Convention, for instance, implores governments to respect the cultures and spiritual values of the 
indigenous peoples, including their relationship with their land, particularly the manner in which they own it – i.e. 
customary ownership. Article 14 emphasizes the need for governments to identify, recognize and protect the traditional 
forms of land ownership of the indigenous peoples, i.e. customary land rights. The Convention also makes a provision 
for the need for governments to consult indigenous peoples in matters related to the allocation of their lands, 
particularly if such allocations are to be made to outsiders (Article 17(2)). Furthermore, the Convention prevents 
outsiders from taking advantage of the autochthons‟ customs and/or indigenous peoples‟ ignorance in terms of how they 
can access land. 
Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights provides that the right to property shall be guaranteed 
(Organisation of African Unity, 1981). The scope of Article 14 of the African Charter does not only apply to individual 
property but also apply to collective/communal rights to land which are essentially grounded on cultural norms. The 
Charter places upon governments‟ party to the Charter an obligation to protect the customary people‟s rights to property 
by putting in place appropriate pieces of legislation. In this regard, by expropriating customary lands in order to 
promote private investment, states are abrogating human rights of marginalised communities. 
Other than the ILO Convention and African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the UN Declaration, and the Draft 
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples were developed to further reaffirm the need for governments 
of the UN member states to uphold and legitimise concerns/rights of the indigenous peoples to land and 
self-determination (United Nations, 2008; Carino, 2006; MacKay, 2004). Article 26 of the UN Declaration, for instance, 
states that: 
International Journal of Social Science Studies                                                      Vol. 4, No. 3; 2016 
9 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the 
lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. States shall give legal recognition and 
protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the 
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned (United Nations, 2008: 10, 
emphasis added). 
It is evident from the preceding text that interest in the welfare of the indigenous peoples, including their access to land, 
is growing all over the world. Durning (1992) argues that this is, in part, because of the growing awareness from the 
international community of the existence of a direct link between rural peoples and sustainable economic development. 
The indigenous peoples‟ way of life is said to be very ideal for driving forward the sustainability agenda. According to 
Durning (1992: 6 – 7), this can be attributed to a number of factors: 
First, indigenous peoples are the sole guardians of vast, little-disturbed habitats that modern society depend on 
more than they may realise – to regulate water cycles, maintain the stability of the climate, and provide valuable 
plants, animals, and genes. Their homelands may harbour more endangered plant and animal species than all the 
world‟s nature reserves. Second, they possess, in their ecological knowledge, an asset of incalculable value: a 
map to the biological diversity of the earth on which all life depends. Encoded in indigenous languages, customs, 
and practices may be as much understanding of nature as is stored in the libraries of modern science. 
According to Durning (1992) and Carino (2006), the indigenous people‟s desire and ability to observe sustainability is 
due to two main factors. The first is that these people have a long-standing view that they are not the owners of land and 
other natural resources. Rather, they consider themselves as mere custodians or stewards of natural resources and 
biodiversity, thereby self-imposing some degree of restriction in the way they exploit natural resources. Secondly, ritual 
restrictions also play an important role of a watchdog against over-exploitation of natural resources. For example, there 
are certain forests in Africa where it is considered an offence by the traditional leadership to cut trees because it is 
believed that such forests are a source of rain (Peters, 2002, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing factors, indigenous peoples from across the world feel that their efforts in driving the 
sustainability agenda are not being recognised by the campaigners of sustainable development. In order to correct this 
misrepresentation, over 300 indigenes from across the world gathered at the International Indigenous Peoples Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Kimberly, South Africa, August 20 – 23, 2002, at which they reaffirmed their 
commitment to human and environmental sustainability (Carino, 2006). Their concerns and commitments were well 
summarised in what became known as the Kimberly Declaration (2002) that was signed by all the indigenous leaders in 
attendance, and submitted to the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, 26 August – 4 
September 2002 (the Rio+10). In their submission, the indigenes stated that: 
We, the Indigenous Peoples, ... are the original peoples tied to the land by our umbilical cords and the dust of our 
ancestors…Our special places are sacred and demand the highest respect …As peoples, we reaffirm our rights to 
self-determination and to own, control and manage our ancestral lands and territories, waters and other resources. 
Our lands and territories are at the core of our existence – we are the land and the land is us; we have a distinct 
spiritual and material relationship with our lands and territories and they are inextricably linked to our survival 
and to the preservation and further development of our knowledge systems and cultures, conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem management (Kimberly Declaration, 2002: 1).  
Inspite of indigenous peoples‟ desire and ability to contribute to conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
Durning (1992: 4) shows that their rights are constantly “endangered by onrushing forces of the outside world” as 
governments, in the name of development and/or improvements in local living standards, seek to integrate such rights 
into capitalist models of holding land. Lobulu (1998), for instance, narrates how in 1987 the Prime Minister, through the 
“Extinction of Customary Land Rights Order” in Tanzania, aimed at wiping out all traditional tenure system in that 
country. In particular, the Order stated that “All customary land rights within the areas specified in the Schedule to this 
Order which areas are in Arusha Region, are hereby extinguished; [And] where any customary land right is 
extinguished in accordance with paragraph 2, the land shall rest in the District Council which has jurisdiction over the 
area where the land is situated and that District Council may distribute that land in the way it deems fit” (ibid). Hence, 
despite the existence of legal provisions on the customary land rights highlighted in section 1, indigenous peoples‟ 
rights to land in Zambia and many other developing countries still risk extinction. Subsequently, some commentators 
have argued that forcing capitalist models of holding land for development or progress on tribal peoples does not 
necessarily make them happier or healthier (Survival International, 2007). For instance, in his tour of the Amazon in 
2008, Bruce Parry discovered that according to the „uncontacted tribes‟ of the Amazon, progress or development was 
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the major cause of disease and hence a potential cause of their extinction (Note 1). The most important factor for the 
well-being of the Amazon people was whether their rights to land were guaranteed, respected and protected (ibid). 
While this section highlights international recognition for customary land tenure, the instruments referred to merely 
grant social legitimacy to the need to secure all forms of customary land rights. The legislative instruments required to 
effect and enforce the security of customary land tenure entail the integration of socially legitimised instruments into 
statutory land tenure systems. In the following section, we highlight how the development of land policy from the 
pre-colonial era to the current post-colonial land reform era has attempted to or failed to integrate socially legitimised 
instruments into statutory land tenure systems in Zambia. 
3. Land Tenure/Policy in Zambia: A Historical Perspective  
The history of land policy development in Zambia and how it affects customary land rights is threefold: pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial.  
3.1 Pre-colonial Era 
Prior to the coming in of the white settler community in 1890, all land in the country was held jointly by families or by 
a chief or chieftainess on behalf of the community in accordance with the community‟s respective customary laws 
(Mudenda, 2007, p.351). The resource was considered to be a free gift from God and hence the individuals in the 
land-owning group had the right to use the land but not to sell it (GRZ, 2002, p.3).  Nonetheless, the people were 
allowed to transfer rights in land for consideration, or as gifts subject to the local conditions and customs, while interest 
in land could also be inherited in accordance with the respective customary laws (ibid: 3). For example, as early as the 
1800s in the Barotse Kingdom (now Western Province), open access resources were co-owned by several villages, who 
also collectively designated areas into wildlife sanctuaries and forest reserves. Systems were also collectively put in 
place to manage use-rights through the sharing of benefits (e.g. harvest and off-takes) and the establishment of storage 
facilities for emergency use (Mbewe et al. 2005). Customary laws were also recognised as well established user-group 
rules, sacred controls and civic controls that were clearly understood and accepted by community members. By-laws 
were also associated with penal codes and sanctions instituted to effect land use by stipulating what to do and what not 
to do (Kayambazinthu et al. 2003). Examples of customary rights to land included rights to occupy, administer or 
cultivate land; or rights to hunt in an area (Berry 1989). 
Customary laws were therefore recognised as rights that were negotiated at community level, with rules agreed to in 
relation to these rights. These laws generally formed the primary system that governed interactions between traditional 
landowners, which made them important social forces (Yung & Belsky 2007). However, several examples show lack of 
continuity in the effectiveness of customary laws due to the influx of new institutions created during the colonial and 
post-colonial periods. During these periods, some functions and responsibilities of the traditional leadership, which are 
key to effecting customary laws, were either taken up by the new institutions or found to be irrelevant and done away 
with (Kayambazinthu et al. 2003). 
3.2 Colonial Era 
The traditional tenure systems that existed before 1890 were affected by the arrival of the first European settlers. The 
advent of colonialism saw the development of policies and government legislation that provided a legal framework for 
land use and management, which weakened traditional systems of land management and inadvertently undermined 
traditional tenure systems and decision-making processes (Mbewe et al. 2005). Through this legal framework, 
structures of power were altered to allow colonial authorities appoint their own candidates to positions of authority 
within them. New overarching structures of government were established for central control over powers of coercion 
over rights to access, use and manage land (Berry 1989).  
The colonial legislative framework saw the division of the country into three categories of land, namely: crown land, 
reserves and trust land. The Europeans introduced the system of holding land under certificate of title and consequently 
led to their settlement on crown land, which was the most fertile and rich in minerals (Mudenda, 2007, p.367). To this 
effect, the Lands and Deeds Registry Act – Chapter 185 was enacted in 1944 to provide for: (1) the registration of 
documents; (2) the issuance of provisional certificates of title and certificates of title; and, (3) the transfer and 
transmission of registered land and for incidental matters so as to ensure that all interests in the land and other 
immovable properties were systematically registered (GRZ, 2006).  
Prior to registration, crown land was surveyed. This land was administered under English Law, in which leasehold and 
freehold tenure systems were practiced and guaranteed (Mudenda, 2007, p.367). The registration of crown land enabled 
white settlers to use title deeds as collateral in borrowing money to develop their land. This enabled them to develop 
their land more economically than reserve land. Ownership of crown land by indigenous people was not permitted, 
except with permission to stay either as licensees in compounds or as house servants for the white settlers (Mutale, 
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2004).  The indigenous people were expected to always return to their homelands (reserve lands). Crown land 
comprised 6 percent (45,180 square kilometres) of the total land mass. The remaining 94 percent (707,820 square 
kilometres) comprised trust and reserve land. Trust land was set-aside for public purposes and was unregistered. On the 
other hand, reserve land was set aside for indigenous people who traced their ancestry in particular areas within the 
country (Mudenda, 2007, p.365).   
3.3 Post Independence Era 
After gaining independence from Britain in 1964, Northern Rhodesia became Zambia. Zambia, like most independent 
countries in southern Africa after the colonial era, changed its property rights systems.  This change of property rights 
systems was similar to the colonial era and further weakened customary laws, since they were associated with clans and 
other groups considered to be problematic for the newly independent countries (McCay 1996). In order to manage these 
problematic customary systems, statutory land regulations cut across all forms of land categories. These statutory 
regulations followed socialist ideologies under the Zambian Government at the attainment of independence, which was 
largely constituted by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and led to the re-categorisation of crown land as 
state land, while reserve and trust lands were combined into customary land. The UNIP government made additional 
major land reforms in 1975 and 1985. Further reforms were made by the successive Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) government in the 1990‟s (Brown, 2005). The following sections highlight how these reforms 
affected customary land rights that existed prior to the post-independence era. 
3.3.1 Land Reforms of 1975  
The cornerstone of the land reforms of 1975 was the “Watershed Speech” made by the then president of the Republic of 
Zambia, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda to the UNIP National Council on 30
th
 June 1975. Under the section dealing with land 
reform, the speech read:  
The political rule of UNIP on land is that this is a gift from God and cannot be sold and especially be made the 
subject of speculation by human exploiters (Kaunda, 1975). 
This presidential decree on land matters led to the development of government legislation that weakened traditional 
tenure systems - the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act number 20 of 1975, chapter 289 of the laws of Zambia. The Act 
introduced a land nationalisation programme by vesting all land in Zambia in the President, to be held by him in 
perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of Zambia (Mudenda, 2007, p.380). By vesting all land in the President, this 
legislative framework inadvertently undermined traditional tenure systems and decision-making processes. In addition, 
freehold tenure was abolished and substituted with the renewable statutory leaseholds for a maximum period of 99 years, 
effective 1
st
 July 1975 (ibid). All sales of land per se (except improvements on the land) were prohibited (Mudenda, 
2007, p.382). All undeveloped land was acquired by the central or local government, as were most forms of rented 
property (ibid). In exercise of his powers, the President was empowered to fix the maximum amount received, 
recovered or secured in any land transaction, provided that in fixing such amount, no regard was to be taken of the value 
of the land, only the developments on the land (Mudenda, 2007, p.382). The granting, alienation or transfer of land to 
non–Zambians was also prohibited (ibid). 
3.3.2 Land reforms of 1985 
The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act of 1975 was amended in 1985. This was done to extend ownership rights to 
non-Zambians through the granting, alienation or transfer of land. This could be done if: (1) a person had been approved 
as an investor in accordance with the law relating to the promotion of investment in Zambia; (2) the interests or rights in 
land were being inherited upon death or were being transferred under a right of survivorship or by other operation of 
law; (3) the interests or the rights in question arose out of a lease, sublease or under lease for a period not exceeding 5 
years or a tenancy agreement; (4) it was a non-profit making organization or institution; and (5) the president of Zambia 
had given his consent in writing under his hand (Mudenda, 2007, p.385). 
3.3.3 The post-1991 reforms under the MMD government 
In 1991, the country experienced a major change in terms of its political and economic governance. The term of office 
of the UNIP government came to an end, and the new government under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) came into power. Thus, the country changed from a one-party state with socialist ideologies to a multi-party 
state with a liberalized market economy. This economic change was associated with privatization of land ownership 
through a Land Bill of 1993. However, this Bill was controversial in the sense that it was drafted by the top leadership 
without the consultation of the key stakeholders such as traditional leaders, the general public and civil society 
organisations. The privatisation of land was hence seen as a government move that would disadvantage the majority of 
poor people, who had no capacity to purchase land or access it through the laborious and expensive land delivery 
system of the government (Mudenda, 2007, p.406). Therefore, the traditional leaders, civil society and other key 
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stakeholders rejected the Bill, arguing that once turned into law it would disadvantage the majority poor people and 
undermine the authority of traditional leaders with regard to administration of customary land (ibid). However, the Bill 
was passed into law in 1995 and is still in effect as the „Lands Act of 1995‟. This Act replaced the Land (Conversion of 
Titles) Act of 1975 and Land (Conversion of Titles) Amendment Act of 1985.  
The Lands Act of 1995 provides for: (1) the continuation of vesting land in the president in perpetuity for and on behalf 
of the people of Zambia; (2) the recognition of an economic value to land. Thus, from 1995 both land and 
improvements on land can be monetised and sold; (3) the establishment of a land development fund for rural 
development; and (4) the establishment of the Lands Tribunal for speedy resolution of land disputes.  
In relation to customary land, the 1995 Lands Act has made mention of customary tenure in two sections where it makes 
simultaneous provisions for: 1) the recognition and continuation of customary land; and 2) for the conversion of 
customary tenure to statutory tenure. Section 7 (1) provides that: 
Every piece of land in a customary area which immediately before the commencement of the Lands 
Act was vested in or held by any person under customary tenure shall continue to be so held and 
recognised. 
This proviso in the Act appears to offer legal protection to occupants of customary land, and thus entails that customary 
tenure is a legally recognised system of land ownership in Zambia. On the other hand, section 8(1) provides that: 
Notwithstanding the recognition and continuation of customary tenure, any person who holds land 
under customary tenure may convert it into a leasehold tenure not exceeding ninety-nine years on 
application. 
Primarily this proviso was aimed at increasing land under state control and opening more land to both local and foreign 
investment. But these provisions of the Lands Act have been received with mixed feelings around the country, with 
some commentators arguing that the provision to convert customary land into leaseholds is the very source of the 
widespread eviction threats/displacements, elite capture, socio-economic exclusion, intra-community conflicts, 
community disquiet, sub-divisions and enclosures of common pool resources (Brown, 2005). These impacts are 
regarded as embodiments of social division in the Zambian context (Peters, 1992) as they further weaken traditional 
land tenure systems by bringing more land under statutory regulations. In a recent research (Malambo, 2013), of all 
customary land that was converted to leaseholds in Chibombo District in Central Province in April and July 2013, only 
2% were converted by applicants from within rural communities while 98% were converted by outsider applicants. 
4. Methodology 
The research was primarily qualitative in nature and adopted a case study approach, where the Shimukunami chiefdom 
in Lufwanyama District was studied (figure 1). The Shimukunami chiefdom, in particular, and Lufwanyama District, in 
general, were chosen as an ideal case that would provide empirical data on customary land rights based on the views of 
indigenous stakeholders, including traditional rulers and the local communities. Other stakeholders that were identified 
as key informants included legal and lands officers at the Ministry of Lands; a research officer at the High Court 
(Lusaka); local authority representatives at Lufwanyama District Council; and a representative from the Zambia Land 
Alliance (a consortium of non-governmental organisations with a stake in land matters). The main method of data 
collection used with the stakeholders was in-depth face-to-face interviews. Secondary data were also gathered through 
an analysis of international literature as well as judgments on land-related cases obtained from within Africa. Another 
set of interviews were conducted in North-western Province, which included the provincial lands officer at the Ministry 
of Lands (provincial office); two officers at the Department of Agriculture in Solwezi; and two representatives of the 
Mumena Royal Establishment in Mumena chiefdom, Solwezi. Fieldwork was conducted between October and 

























Figure 1. Map showing location of study area (Source: modified from Lufwanyama Department of Physical Planning 
and Housing, 2013) 
Focus group discussions were conducted with indigenous local communities as customary landholders in the 
Shimukunami chiefdom in order to determine the consistency of empirical data from other key stakeholders, thereby 
also enhancing data validation. This method of data collection was considered most appropriate since the indigenous 
landholders were more open to discuss in groups than as individuals. This mode of communication was also found to be 
the norm in most rural areas of Zambia. Furthermore, focus group discussions were found to be more vibrant and 
facilitated interjection from other members of the group.  
In terms of sampling, the study adopted non-probability sampling because the population size was not entirely known, 
making it difficult to determine individual probability. Under the non-probability sampling techniques, purposive 
sampling and convenience sampling were chosen. The former was used to select stakeholders that were known 
beforehand that they had a role to play in land matters (e.g. chiefs, lands officers, and relevant land administration 
agencies), while the latter was used to select rural communities.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Interpretation of sections 7 and 8 of the Lands Act 
Section 7(1) of Zambia‟s Lands Act provides for the recognition and continuation of customary land tenure. When 
asked about the interpretation of such a provision, the legal officer at the Ministry of Lands (MOL) responded that the 
section merely assures customary landholders that they would not be deprived of the rights they held before the Lands 
Act was enacted in 1995. The section simply takes into account the „welfare‟ of the people in a customary area and not 
necessarily providing security of tenure through ownership titles (I1 - Legal Officer).  It was found that although the 
Act „recognizes‟ customary land, it does not give effect to registration of its ownership. In terms of section 8 (1), which 
provides for the conversion of customary tenure to leaseholds, respondents noted that the section enables people who 
held land under customary tenure without title, to obtain title on their land (I1 – Legal Officer). Similar sentiments were 
raised by respondent 15 (a researcher at the High Court in Lusaka – the respondent was also a lawyer). When asked 
whether and to what extent, if at all, sections 7(1) and 8(1) contradicted/conflicted one another, the respondent stated in 
the email correspondence that: 
The Act envisages that the person that will convert customary tenure to leasehold tenure is one who first must 
have acquired the rights under the customary tenure. The Act has to that effect provided a control by way of 
procedure of conversion under Section 4. Any person who fails to follow the procedure will be sanctioned and 
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the title to land deemed null and void. Thus, when a person is victimized by the other who purports to have 
obtained title to it without meeting the procedural requirements, the victim has liberty to invoke Section 4 
„protection‟. Any conflict? In my view, there is no conflict. Only that lack of enlightenment by most customary 
tenure land holders is costing their well vested rights even in the face of the shield in section 4 (personal email 
communication, 9 May 2014)..  
The same question was also asked to respondent 16 (lawyer and former Commissioner of Lands at the Ministry of 
Lands in Lusaka). His sentiments were similar to those of respondent 15 above, arguing that there was nothing wrong 
with the provisions in the Lands Act of 1995. Even the two sections under investigations were okay. The respondent 
went on to say that while the provisions of the sections were in good faith, the problem was with the implementation 
vis-a-vis following the necessary land allocation procedure as top government officials were sometimes found to 
disregard the formal procedure. 
While concerns for individual title ownership are addressed through the conversion of customary tenure to leasehold 
tenure, there is no provision for the converse. This clearly indicates that the statutory tenure system is held in higher 
esteem than the customary land tenure system. It was noted that legislation is silent on the registration of customary 
ownership rights and only provides for conversion to private ownership rights, implying that only the elite and notable 
locals can own land that is secure and not subject to conflicts. Chieftainess Shimukunami highlighted in interview that 
some of the problems surrounding the conversion of customary land into leaseholds were as a result of the fact that 
while the Lands Act authorises the President to allocate land to an investor, this cannot be done without consulting the 
local chief. However, consultations with traditional authorities are limited to surface land rights since the Act exempts 
minerals from coming under the control of the chiefs. The foregoing interpretation of the legislation implies that while 
surface rights belong to the chiefs, the underground/mining rights belong to government, which further suggests that the 
latter seem to preside over the former. The implication of this, according to the Chieftainess, is that the government may 
at any time issue mining licenses to investors without taking into consideration the rights of the local people.  
Our findings show that section 8(1) (on conversion) takes precedence over section 7(1) (on recognition), making 
statutory tenure being of greater importance over customary tenure because the latter does not provide security of tenure 
through ownership titles. This was evidenced by 12 (Zambia Land Alliance), who revealed that the two sections clearly 
contradict each other because “it does not make sense for the same Act to recognise customary tenure while at the same 
time making provisions that seek to wipe out the same tenure system it seeks to recognise”. The implication of this is 
customary tenure insecurity and an associated avalanche of evictions, elite capture, sub-division and enclosures of 
common pool resources, land grabs, and land conflicts. 
5.2 Recognition of Customary Tenure 
On the issue of „recognition‟ in the Lands Act, I1 (Legal Officer, MOL) noted clearly that although customary tenure is a 
legally recognised form of land tenure, it does not offer security of tenure, leading to widespread evictions from 
customary land. I3 (Provincial Lands Officer, MOL) further illustrates this understanding by stating that “recognition of 
customary land is more or less super fiction”. The respondent indicated that the recognition mentioned in the Lands Act 
“[was] not there in reality because it does not provide entitlement.” He further substantiated his interpretation by giving an 
example of a case in Kalumbila (an area in North-western Province where a mine is proposed to be opened) where 
518,000 square kilometres of land has been converted, leaving many families without land while the promised 
compensation programme is not only slow but the amounts are considered inadequate by the beneficiaries. 
It can therefore be seen that in Zambia the recognition of customary land without any evidence of security of land 
ownership is thus artificial and has led to the many eviction cases in the country (Brown, 2005) as one can only be 
protected if they convert their land to obtain title. In essence, therefore, ownership of customary land cannot be proved, let 
alone defended, by occupants of customary tenure when evicted. As revealed by I4 (Department of Agriculture, Solwezi), 
the recognition provided for in the Lands Act is weak and has also been poorly implemented because a title deed is 
considered of greater importance. The issue of social legitimacy of customary tenure seems to be overlooked in Zambia as 
legality is seen to be taking centre stage. On the other hand, it was also revealed in discussions with chiefs’ subjects that 
sometimes the chiefs are to blame when it comes to the conversion of customary land as provided by the Lands Act. 
Although the Act provides that when making the decision to allocate land, especially to an outsider, the chief must consult 
their subjects, some respondents argued that chiefs in most cases do not consult their subjects especially if the investor is 
of a high profile as transactions of that nature can often involve exchange of big sums of money as a “token of 
appreciation” for land. This finding is in agreement with Brown’s (2005) findings where he states that some chiefs in 
Zambia have assumed the positions of business tycoons with closer ties to outsiders. When presenting a number of cases 
in Zambia where traditional rulers have had problems dealing with their subjects regarding allocation of customary land to 
high profile private investors,for example, Brown (2005: 95 – 96) reports that in 1996 there were only 3 investors with 
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titles to land in Chieftainess Chiawa’s area on the outskirts of Lower Zambezi National Park. By 1999, 19 more tour 
operators had acquired titles on land converted from customary tenure. Lodges were built on river-side locations where 
scenery and wildlife viewing were at their best. The investors (white Zambians and foreigners) fenced off their land and 
could conduct routine patrols. The investors did not recognize previously-held land use rights. It is reported that due to her 
pro-development stance Chieftainess Chiawa had had a litany of run-ins with her subjects. The chieftainess is an 
outspoken proponent of outside investment in her area. At one time she even appeared in a television advertisement 
promoting the virtues of the 1995 Lands Act, using tourist and agricultural developments in her chiefdom as her backdrop. 
But the number of leaseholds the Chieftainess has sanctioned – and her positive attitude towards private foreign investors 
– have undermined her local support. She is accused of having a hidden agenda and failing to listen to her subjects.  
In another case, a more volatile encounter between chief and subjects ensued in Mbeza on the Kafue flats – a very 
fertile floodplain along the Kafue River. The chief of the area, Bright Nalubamba, had been pushing for a section of the 
floodplain to be developed as a rice farm. With the backing of Italian investors, the chief hoped to transform the area 
into a private commercial farming block – the Mbeza Integrated Project. Although the investors claimed that no one was 
going to be displaced, the local Ila people resisted the project on the basis that they would lose grazing land. 
Accordingly, the residents formed the Indigenous People‟s Rights Committee (IPRC) to challenge the chief‟s 
clandestine motive. Despite the antagonism, police deployment, court cases, threats and confrontations between the 
chief and IPRC, the development-intended project was put on hold (ibid). Furthermore, Mpundu (2006), in her Panos 
Features article, reports of a case in Kabanje, a small village near Mazabuka town (130km south of Lusaka) where a 
land dispute erupted between villagers and a private sugar-manufacturing firm. Over 100 families and their 17,000 
cattle were facing an eviction threat as Zambia Sugar Plc was claiming ownership of the land (locally known as Farm 
1343) occupied by the villagers for over 50 years. The reason advanced by the firm was that it needed to expand its 
operations in order to meet the growing European demand for sugar. Despite the potential advantages of the expansion 
to the local community (e.g. creation of jobs – which the residents themselves actually acknowledged), the local 
communities, backed by their traditional ruler, vehemently refused to move, arguing that: 
We know no other home than this. Our parents were born here. We were born here and our children [were] born 
here. There is no other home we know. Where are we going to move to?...Our Malende (ancestral shrines) and 
the graves of our families are all here. How do we vacate and leave the remains of our forefathers in strange 
custody? (ibid: online). 
In an effort to register their displeasure at relocating, the villagers even went to the extent of burning sugar cane fields, 
while some of their ring leaders, mostly headmen, were arrested and taken to court for disobeying a Lusaka High Court 
eviction order.  
6. Conclusion and Recommendation(s) 
What seems to emerge from this research is that while the two sections in contention seem to be not contradictory to the 
lawyers, they are confusing and actually contradictory to an ordinary person, including civil servants like the Provincial 
Lands Officer who said the recognition of customary tenure as provided by s. 7(1) of the Lands Act 1995 is „super 
fiction‟. This is cause for concern because the fact that the ambiguity of the said sections are felt by senior government 
officers in the Ministry of Lands presents a precarious situation where interpreting the Act becomes challenged due to 
lack of understanding by those officers like the Lands Officers who interpret/implement the national laws. Furthermore, 
the research reveals that due to the widespread none-following of correct land allocation procedures in many land 
allocation agencies, although the Lands Act of 1995 ostensibly recognises customary tenure, it does not provide tenure 
security in that it does not protect this kind of tenure by way of entitlement. Strictly speaking, state recognition without 
legal protection as provided for in the African Charter is, as one respondent told us in our survey, regarded as “super 
fiction”. A conclusion can therefore be drawn to say that intrinsically the Lands Act has not recognised customary 
tenure. It is also clear from the findings that the Lands Act holds customary tenure in lower esteem than statutory tenure 
because it has not provided for its registration or any form of entitlement as is the case with other countries like 
Botswana and Tanzania where customary tenure is not only legally recognised (as in Zambia) but also legally protected 
– meaning that the customary land law there is equivalent to the state codified law (Knight, 2010). Customary tenure is 
therefore perceived to be insecure by most people in the country as those with title deeds can easily prove ownership in 
a court of law and thus protect themselves against evictions. The Zambian land law can therefore be regarded as biased 
because statutory tenure seems to be taking precedence over customary tenure thereby causing uncertainties and 
ambiguities in the customary land sector. These findings therefore question the extent to which (if at all) the 
international law on the rights of indigenous people with respect to property rights/land (like the ILO Convention 169 
and African Charter) are respected/domesticated in Zambia.  
In view of our findings, we recommend that the Zambian government should show commitment to strengthening 
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customary land rights and administration by emulating their best practice counterparts in sub-Saharan Africa like 
Tanzania and Botswana. Both these countries have properly recognised customary tenure by way of enacting separate 
customary land laws – the Village Land Act 1999 and the Tribal Land Act 1968, respectively. Since these laws are held 
to be bespoke, they define more specifically the land rights of people under customary tenure and solely deal with 
customary tenure whilst allowing also space for customs.  
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